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T he importance of a well-functioning legal and regulatory system in creating an effective market economy is now widely accepted. After all, a poor contracting and regulatory environment can raise the cost of doing busi-
ness with knock-on effects to employment, output, investment, productivity, and 
living standards. But how to measure or even to conceptualize differences in the 
business climate is far from settled. Should the focus be on a few specific indicators 
or many? Can whatever indicators are chosen be usefully compared across time and 
countries? Can such data be updated in a timely way as policy reforms occur?
One flagship project that tries to measure the environment in which businesses 
operate in countries across the world is the World Bank’s Doing Business project, 
which was launched in 2002. At its core, this project gathers quantitative data to 
compare regulations faced by small and medium-size enterprises across economies 
and over time. The centerpiece of the project is the annual Doing Business report. It 
was first published in 2003 with five sets of indicators for 133 economies, and currently 
includes 11 sets of indicators for 189 economies. The report includes a table that 
ranks each country in the world according to its scores across the indicators.
The Doing Business project has become a major resource for academics, jour-
nalists, and policymakers. The project also enjoys a high public profile with close to 
ten million hits on its website each year, making it one of the most prominent knowl-
edge products produced by the World Bank. When Narendra Modi was elected 
Prime Minister of India, he explicitly targeted achieving 50th place in the ranking as 
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a benchmark for his administration—which would mean an improvement of almost 
100 places compared to India’s recent rankings (for example, Buerkle 2015). In 
2012 Russian President Vladimir Putin set the goal of improving its Doing Business 
ranking to twentieth by 2018 (as reported in Adelaja 2012). Many countries are 
keen to promote their achievements in moving up the rankings in trying to attract 
investors, which is acknowledged in government export promotion strategies. For 
example, the UK government mentions Peru’s ranking of 43 on “ease of doing 
business” prominently in its assessment of its business climate (UK Trade & Invest-
ment 2014). The project has passed from being a data source and research tool to 
playing a role in the political economy of development policy.
Leading academic economists have been involved in the Doing Business 
report from the start, both on the design of indicators and in using the results 
in research, and so in general terms, the report reflects the broad direction of 
mainstream thinking in development economics. Thus, it is now common to talk 
about the institutional underpinnings of development and the quality of the state 
in supporting development (for example, Besley and Persson 2011; Acemoglu 
and Robinson 2012). The Doing Business report collects data for a terrain over 
which there had been only scant knowledge previously, and so it is no surprise that 
academic researchers and policy analysts have taken the data to heart. Since 2003, 
over 2,000 research articles have been published in peer-reviewed academic jour-
nals using this data, with more than 5,000 working papers being posted online.
With such interest, it’s no surprise that the Doing Business report has come under 
intense scrutiny. In 2012, following discussions by its board, the World Bank commis-
sioned an independent review to evaluate the project (see http://www.dbrpanel.org/), 
on which I served as a member. In broad terms, the Doing Business report has been 
criticized for the way in which the data are collected and whether they reflect the busi-
ness and regulatory environment accurately. Concerns were raised about whether the 
construction of the survey fostered a “deregulation bias.” A measure of labor market 
regulation was a particular focus of concern, although this measure had already been 
removed from the set of measures used to determine aggregate rankings. Particular 
attention has focused on whether it is valid to collect the separate rankings into an 
aggregate ranking. A number of countries objected to being ranked at all.
Of course, alongside the specifics of the Doing Business report data, there 
are the usual concerns about the use of data that permeate empirical research 
in economics. Some researchers have used the data as a right-hand-side variable 
to “explain” outcomes of interest. Others put the data on the left-hand-side and 
ask how politics and institutions influence the business climate. In all cases, the 
usual concerns apply as to what inferences about causality can be drawn from such 
exercises. There is also a concern about the mapping from the Doing Business 
indicators to the conceptual categories that economic theory suggests ought to be 
important. Because so many researchers appear to equate “empirical evidence” with 
interpreting regression coefficients, this point merits discussion.
In the next section of this paper, I will describe how the Doing Business project 
works and illustrate its modus operandi with some of the key findings of the 2015 
Timothy Besley     101
report. I address what is valuable about the project before turning to the criticisms 
of it. I then discuss some wider political economy issues illustrated by the report.
The main message of the paper is that, even with all of its imperfections, data 
collection of the kind undertaken by the Doing Business project is an integral part 
of the political economy of policymaking. The indicators try to get at features of the 
policy climate that many economists have been arguing are vital to economic progress 
but where no internationally comparable data was previously available. The story of 
the Doing Business project is one where a particular worldview can become influen-
tial and the impact of economic ideas enhanced through the collection of data.
How the Doing Business Project Works
It is useful to begin with a broad understanding of how the Doing Business 
project works. The data collection surveys law firms, with around 10,000 question-
naires being fielded across the participating countries. Data are collected in a 
questionnaire concerning 11 specific topics:
1) Starting a Business is a measure of the procedures, time, cost, and minimum capi-
tal required to start a new business.
2) Dealing with Construction Permits is a measure of the procedures, time, and cost 
required to build a warehouse.
3) Getting Electricity is a measure of the procedures, time, and cost required for a busi-
ness to obtain a permanent electricity connection for a newly constructed 
warehouse.
4) Registering Property is a measure of the procedures, time, and cost required to 
register commercial real estate.
5) Getting Credit assesses the strength of the Legal Rights index, which measures the 
degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of bor-
rowers and lenders, and the depth of the Credit Information index, which 
measures the sharing of credit information.
6) Protecting Investors measures the extent of disclosure and director liability, and the 
ease of shareholder lawsuits.
7) Paying Taxes measures the number of taxes paid, hours per year spent preparing 
tax returns and the total tax payable as a share of gross profit.
8) Trading Across Borders is a measure of the number of documents, cost, and time 
required to export and import goods.
9) Enforcing Contracts is a measure of the procedures, time, and cost required to 
enforce a debt contract.
10) Resolving Insolvency is a measure of the time, cost, and percentage recovery rate 
involved with bankruptcy proceedings.
11) Employing Workers is a measure of the ease with which workers can be hired or 
made redundant and the rigidity of working hours, although this index is no 
longer used in the aggregate rankings.
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As far as possible, the data collection is based on a reading of the laws and 
regulatory provisions. However, some assessment is inevitably subjective and reflects 
custom and practice in implementing the law. For example, the number of processes 
involved in starting a business can be interpreted by looking at actual laws. However, a 
question about the time that it takes to start a business is not asking about a schedule 
laid down in a specific statute, and can be regarded as a de facto measure of what 
commonly happens.
The indicators are intended to be comparable across countries, which is 
facilitated by basing the data collection on a precisely defined hypothetical enter-
prise and the circumstances that it faces. The central case is a firm with at least 
60 employees, which is located in the country’s largest business city. It is a private, 
limited-liability company and does not operate in an export-processing zone or 
an industrial estate with special export or import privileges. It is 100 percent 
domestically owned, and exports constitute more than 10 percent of its sales. 
While this detailed hypothetical makes comparisons feasible, the importance of 
limited-liability companies varies a lot from country-to-country, and there is an 
issue of how relevant the indicators are across all sectors of the economy and all 
types of enterprises. For example, the findings would not apply automatically to 
the agricultural sector, which is a large part of the economy in many low-income 
countries. (In fact, the Doing Business team has now started a separate project 
on agriculture.)
After receiving the survey responses, an “in house” team at the World Bank 
cross-checks the responses against the relevant laws and regulations. After internal 
consultation, an index score is created on each dimension. The result is the “raw” 
data, which are available on the website in disaggregated form. It is a fair critique 
that the way in which the questionnaires are processed to get a final score is not 
altogether transparent. But in this way, the Doing Business project is not unusual. 
It is not clear how to report information from this kind of survey in a meaningful 
way, and one can argue that the honesty of the responses in certain countries might 
suffer if the original data were widely available.
For each of the 11 dimensions in the data, an aggregate score is created by 
taking a simple unweighted average of the ranks of the underlying indicators, which 
leads to a cross-country ranking within each of the 11 topics. To obtain an overall 
Doing Business aggregate ranking, the report calculates a percentile for each 
country for ten of the topics (the Employing Workers category is excluded). These 
percentiles are aggregated to obtain the Ease of Doing Business ranking. These are 
the headline rankings that receive so much attention in media coverage.
The Doing Business report now also measures the distance from the frontier 
to gauge how far countries are from best practice. The benchmark for this exercise 
is the best performance observed on each Doing Business topic across all econo-
mies and years since 2005. The score lies on a scale between 0 and 100. A perfect 
score of 100 would require that the economy is on the frontier in every one of the 
10 dimensions that go into the ranking. A 75, for example, implies that an economy 
is 25 percentage points away from the frontier.
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The aggregate output from the Doing Business 2015 report is illustrated in 
Table 1, which lists the top ten and bottom ten countries along with the distance to 
frontier scores. There are no big surprises. Three countries from Scandinavia are in 
the top ten. A number of countries from sub-Saharan Africa are in the bottom ten, 
along with Haiti, Libya, and Afghanistan. The overall rank and distance from the 
frontier score of the BRIC countries are: Brazil (120, 58.01), Russia (62, 66.66), 
India (142, 53.97), and China (90, 62.58).
Each Doing Business report documents frequent reforms. For example, 
between June 2013 and June 2014, the report lists 230 reforms, with sub-Saharan 
Africa accounting for the largest number. A trend in recent years has been towards 
collecting subnational indicators, to represent better the heterogeneity in some 
countries. For example, the 2015 report included data for two cities, rather than 
just the largest business city, for 11 economies: Bangladesh, Brazil, China, India, 
Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, and the United States.
The underlying indicators reveal striking differences across countries. For 
example, the number of days that it takes to start a business according to that indi-
cator is 144 days in Venezuela, 90 days in Zimbabwe, 25 days in Argentina, and 
2.5 days in Singapore. There is some evidence of within-country variation where this 
Table 1 
Distance to the Frontier Score from the 2015 Doing Business Report 
(100 minus the distance to the frontier score gives the percentage points away from the 
frontier; higher is better)
 
Top 10
 
Country
Distance to 
Frontier score
 
Bottom 10
 
Country
Distance to 
Frontier score
1 Singapore 88.27 180 Haiti 42.18
2 New Zealand 86.91 181 Angola 41.85
3 Hong Kong 84.97 182 Venezuela 41.41
4 Denmark 84.20 183 Afghanistan 41.16
5 South Korea 83.40 184 Democratic 
Republic of Congo
40.60
6 Norway 82.40 185 Chad 37.25
7 United States 81.98 186 South Sudan 35.72
8 United Kingdom 80.96 187 Central African
Republic
34.47
9 Finland 80.33 188 Libya 33.35
10 Australia 80.60 189 Eritrea 33.16
Source: World Bank, Doing Business 2015 report available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/
global-reports/doing-business-2015.
Notes: The distance to the frontier score is calculated relative to the best performance observed on each 
Doing Business topic across all economies and years since 2005. A perfect score of 100 would require 
that the economy is on the frontier in every one of the 10 dimensions that go into the ranking. Zero 
represents the lowest performance. 100 minus the distance to the frontier score give the percentage 
points away from the frontier. A 75, for example, implies that an economy is 25 percentage points away 
from the frontier. For more information, see http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/distance-to-frontier. 
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information is collected, although the within-country variation tends to be small 
compared to the between-country variation.
The ranks on different dimensions of the Doing Business indicators tend to be 
positively correlated with (Spearman) rank correlations across the indicators typi-
cally between 0.3 and 0.6. That said, it is not hard to find cases where countries have 
quite different rankings across dimensions. For example, China is ranked at 35 for 
enforcing contracts but at 128 for starting a business, while Egypt has the opposite 
rank difference with 152 on enforcing contracts and 73 on starting a business. Such 
differences reinforce the need to look beyond the aggregate measures and to drill 
down into the specific performances across the indicators.
Overall, country rank in the Doing Business report tends to be strongly corre-
lated with measures of development success, as well as with income per capita and 
with other standard measures of institutional quality, but this gives little insight 
into the direction of causation. Instead, this is likely to be an instance of what in 
Besley and Persson (2011) we have called “development clustering,” the observed 
phenomenon that most dimensions of development move together. If the exercise 
is valuable for monitoring progress relative to using more standard measures of 
institutional quality and prosperity, it is because the specific indicators are worth 
exploring dimension-by-dimension.
The Value of the Exercise
The Doing Business project provides a unique perspective. But it is important 
for those who use the data to be familiar with how they are collected, rather than 
blindly downloading them and running regressions. The data are quite unique: 
there is no other comparable project in terms of scale or scope. Thus, the Doing 
Business report has the capacity to cast light on dimensions of policymaking that 
were not covered in previous datasets. The current chief economist of the World 
Bank, Kaushik Basu, states the case in his forward to the 2015 edition of the report:
The public discourse on economic policy is overwhelmingly focused on fis-
cal measures, monetary interventions, welfare programs, and other such 
highly visible instruments of government action. Thus when an economy does 
poorly, a disproportionate amount of our debate centers on whether or not it 
needs a fiscal stimulus, whether there should be liquidity easing or tightening, 
whether its welfare programs have been too profligate or too paltry and so on. 
What gets much less attention but is equally—and, in some situations, even 
more—important for an economy’s success or failure is the nuts and bolts 
that hold the economy together and the plumbing that underlies the econ-
omy . . . The World Bank Group’s Doing Business report is an annual statement 
of the state of the nuts and bolts of economies around the world and, as such, 
is one of the most important compendiums of information and analysis of the 
basis of an economy’s effective day-to-day functioning and development.
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Prior to the Doing Business project, little was known about many aspects of 
the business climate. For example, most countries did not collect information 
on the time and effort that goes into starting a business, let alone produce 
such information in a way that could be compared internationally. Other areas 
where the incremental gains from the project in terms of bringing knowledge of 
cross-country differences into the daylight have been especially large include the 
areas of creditor rights and property registration.
Moreover, postponing for a moment the controversies about what is measured 
and how it is measured, it is important to note that the survey is conducted in a 
methodical and transparent way. The Doing Business indicators are updated annu-
ally, which means that policy reforms are soon reflected in the indicators. This feature 
is attractive to both researchers and also to policymakers, who can see their reform 
efforts translated quickly and directly into changes in the index. A consistent meth-
odology has been pursued throughout the project, which means that country-level 
performances can be tracked over time. The Doing Business report is a living project 
that seeks to learn from criticisms with frequent efforts to improve the methodology 
and to expand the domain of the indicators. The methods used are clearly articu-
lated and documented on the website along with the historical data. When indicators 
are changed, there are careful efforts to maintain comparability and to explain 
such changes. This approach contrasts with many other widely used databases that 
are used extensively by economists, such as the International Country Risk Guide, 
where data time series that are comparable before and after methodological changes 
can be hard to come by. The Doing Business project is also quite up-front about the 
limitations of its approach. For example, Table 2.3 in the 2015 report discusses 
the pros and cons of focusing on a standardized type of firm in the formal sector of the 
largest city as well as using opinions from lawyers to assess the environment for doing 
business in a country.
Of course, the fact that what is reported in the Doing Business data is clear 
and transparent should not be confused with the claim that it can tell us about 
the right policy mix for any particular economy. The parallel with more stan-
dard macroeconomic data is instructive. Measuring a fiscal deficit does not, by 
itself, yield any automatic conclusions for the best path for levels of taxing and 
spending. Moreover, details of specific types of taxes and spending and how they 
are implemented can be important. That said, nobody would wish to debate fiscal 
policy without some measure of the budgetary position in hand. Moreover, compa-
rable data on international experiences using common methods of measurement 
are helpful in policy debates, not least in trying to draw lessons from a range 
of experiences.
In this spirit, the key question is whether the Doing Business data provides 
useful information that is relevant to real policy debates concerning the envi-
ronment in which businesses operate. Policymakers in China or Brazil or Egypt 
have good reasons to be interested in how economies like Singapore or Sweden 
approach business regulation without deciding blindly that they should copy these 
practices. The Doing Business rankings provide a way into this question—the basis 
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for beginning a dialogue about policy reform. This discussion was not happening 
on a systematic basis before the Doing Business project came along.
Moreover, there is a valuable contribution to democratic debate made by the 
Doing Business data, which can be downloaded and read by citizens and policymakers 
of any country who wish to know how their country performs and to question whether 
this performance is justified. More generally, the report can be thought of as tool of 
“yardstick competition” between governments: that is, citizens use information that is 
available through the media to hold their governments to account based on perfor-
mance comparisons (for example, Besley and Case 1995; Salmon 1987). After all, if 
the Doing Business comparison is not useful in some cases, it can be always be set 
aside. No country or politician or citizen is obliged to take notice of it.
That said, there is a concern that international pressure can be brought to bear 
when international aid is at stake and when the Doing Business indicators are used 
in policy dialogue or as a form of conditionality. This ties into wider debates about 
whether aid or conditions on aid are an affront to national sovereignty in general 
(for example, see Easterly 2013 for discussion), and is not a concern specific to the 
Doing Business project.
The World Bank has a well-established role in relation to data and statistics 
and, under its open data initiative, now makes much data freely available. These 
efforts by the World Bank acknowledge the key role that data play in development 
debates. Good examples of World Bank–supported initiatives are the World Bank’s 
Living Standards Measurement Studies and the World Bank Enterprise Surveys. The 
collection of data can be valuable to citizens and civil society, even if some of the 
findings can in some cases embarrass the government of a country by highlighting 
policy failures.
Even the debates about the validity of the Doing Business indicators (discussed in 
the next section) point out the usefulness of the project; after all, without the project, 
such debates would have been based only on uninformed conjecture. Taken as a whole, 
the main achievement of the Doing Business project has been to shed light and create 
a more informed debate on a range of differences in laws and regulations across coun-
tries in areas where little was known on a systematic basis before the project began.
Criticisms and Caveats in Context
Concerns about the use of the Doing Business data and the indicators on which 
it is based fall into three main categories: 1) the way in which the project works, 
including some defects that are inherent in the design; 2) the validity of the indica-
tors for policy choices or outcomes; and 3) the underlying objectives and motives of 
those who are designing the indicators. Let us consider these in turn.
The Nature of Exercise
The Doing Business report focuses on formal and legal requirements as 
assessed by legal professionals in that country. Given the specified type of reference 
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firm for which the data are collected, we would not expect the data to correlate with 
the experience of all firms in the economy.
A tradeoff arises here. On one side, given the differences in industrial structure 
and corporate forms across economies, the idea of a standardized firm is necessary 
for international comparisons, even if it limits what can be learned about the broader 
business environment. On the other side, the extent to which the specific reference 
frame created for the standardized firm indicates how firms in general experience the 
business climate is far from clear. For example, in many developing countries, large 
swathes of economic activity are conducted under the radar in the informal sector, 
where the role of formal rules and legal procedures is murky at best. For example, 
Schneider (2002) estimates that the median level of formal economic activity in the 
countries in his sample is around 67 percent, while in the bottom quartile of the coun-
tries in the distribution, around 49 percent of economic activity is formal.
A robust finding in the Doing Business report is that the countries which 
have a higher rank tend to have smaller informal sectors. This pattern suggests 
that the choice to become a formal firm may be a key margin affected by business 
regulation and formal laws. Of course, the Doing Business indicators may offer 
some insight into why some forms of formal enterprise are discouraged. Indeed, 
implicit within the Doing Business approach is the plausible belief that, in the 
end, it is likely to be the development of larger, formal sector firms that will be 
engines of employment creation and poverty reduction. But for that very reason, 
the way in which business conditions affect the extensive margin between whether 
firms choose to be formal and informal may be more important than how such 
rules affect the behavior of the formal sector taken alone.
Firms will experience the business climate differently. Firm-level surveys done 
at the national level, such as the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (at http://www.
enterprisesurveys.org/), offer a useful complement to the Doing Business approach 
to examining regulation. They allow the range of firms surveyed to be broader than 
the stylized type of firm towards which the Doing Business indicators are targeted: 
for example, only about half of the firms in the Enterprise Surveys are privately 
held, limited liability companies, and the proportion in the data varies signifi-
cantly by country. Such detailed surveys are expensive to implement and cannot be 
conducted annually for a broad range of countries. But they can ask useful ques-
tions about the experiences that enterprises have in dealing with government and 
in turn connect these experiences to measures of firm-level performance.
Table 2 describes how certain questions in the Enterprise Surveys are corre-
lated with comparable questions in the Doing Business report. It reports whether 
correlations are positive or negative and includes an asterisk if they are statistically 
significant at 5 percent. The Enterprise Survey question used in each regression 
is given at the start of each panel. We then list the Doing Business indicators that 
were selected to correspond best to this question. Next we report the sign of each 
correlation with that indicator conditioning on year dummies and GDP per capita. 
The first column considers conditional correlations across all firms. The remaining 
columns look at whether these correlations are more robust for those firms in the 
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Table 2 
Enterprise Survey Correlations with Doing Business Indicators
All  
firms
Firm size
(number of workers w)
Firm in  
capital city?
Legal 
structure:  
limited 
liability? 
Small: 
w ≤ 20
Medium: 
20 < w  
≤ 100
Large: 
w > 100 Yes No Yes No
Enterprise Survey Question: Biggest obstacle for firm is finance? [no = 0, yes = 1] 
Doing  
 Business  
 topic:  
 Getting  
 credit
Strength of legal  
 right index
+ + + − + + + +
Depth of credit  
 information  
 index
− − − − − − − −
Public credit  
 registry coverage, 
 % of population
+ + + + +(*) + + +
Private credit  
 registry, % of  
 population
− − − + + − − −
Enterprise Survey Question: How much of an obstacle is access to finance? [High: More severe obstacle] 
Doing  
 Business  
 topic:  
 Getting  
 credit
Strength of legal  
 right index
− − − − − − − −
Depth of credit  
 information  
 index
−(*) −(*) −(*) − − −(*) − −(*)
Public credit  
 registry coverage,  
 % of population
+ + + − + + + +
Private credit  
 registry, % of  
 population
+ + + + + + + +
Enterprise Survey Question: Biggest obstacle for firm is business regulation? [no = 0, yes = 1] 
Doing  
 Business  
 topic:  
 Starting a  
 business
Procedures  
 (number)
+(*) +(*) +(*) + +(*) +(*) +(*) +
Time (days) − − − + − − − +
Cost of income 
 per capita 
− − + −(*) − + + −
Enterprise Survey Question: Biggest obstacle for firm is courts? [no = 0, yes = 1] 
Doing  
 Business  
 topic:  
 Enforcing  
 contracts
Time (days) + + + − + + − +
Cost (% of claim) − − − − − − + −
Procedures  
 (number)
−(*) − − − + −(*) − −
Enterprise Survey Question: How much of an obstacle is the court system? [High: More severe obstacle] 
Doing  
 Business  
 topic:  
 Enforcing  
 contracts 
Time (days) + +(*) + + + +(*) + +
Cost (% of claim) − − − − + − − −
Procedures  
 (number)
− − − − − − − −
(Continued)
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All  
firms
Firm size
(number of workers w)
Firm in  
capital city?
Legal 
structure:  
limited 
liability? 
Small: 
w ≤ 20
Medium: 
20 < w  
≤ 100
Large: 
w > 100 Yes No Yes No
Enterprise Survey Question: Biggest obstacle for firm is customs and trade regulations? [no = 0 , yes = 1]
Doing  
 Business  
 topic:  
 Trading  
 across  
 borders
Documents to  
 export (number)
+ − + + − + − +
Time to export  
 (days)
+ + + + + + + +
Cost to export  
 (US$ per  
 container)
− −(*) + + − − − −(*)
Documents to  
 import (number)
− − − −(*) + − − −
Time to import  
 (days)
− − + − − + + −
Cost to import  
 (US$ per  
 container)
+ +(*) + + + + + +(*)
Enterprise Survey Question: How much of an obstacle are customs and trade regulations? [High: More severe obstacle]
Doing  
 Business  
 topic:  
 Trading  
 across  
 borders
Documents to  
 export (number)
+ + + + (*) + + + +
Time to export  
 (days)
− − + − + − − +
Cost to export  
 (US$ per  
 container)
− − − − − − − −
Documents to  
 import (number)
−(*) −(*) − −(*) − −(*) −(*) −(*)
Time to import  
 (days)
+ + + + + + + +
Cost to import  
 (US$ per  
 container)
−(*) +(*) + + + + +(*) +(*)
Notes: Each panel of reported + or − is from a cross-country regression of the average answer to an Enterprise Survey on 
a selected set of Doing Business indicators. The sample-selection determines the group of firms within each country used 
to construct the Enterprise Survey average. All regressions include year fixed effects and the logarithm of per capita 
GDP in purchasing power parity (PPP) 2005 constant dollars. The Doing Business historical dataset for years 2004 to 
2013 was accessed at http://www.doingbusiness.org/custom-query, retrieved on April 26, 2013. All economies across 
regions and income-groups were included and all topics except Getting Electricity and Paying Taxes were chosen. In the 
dataset, all observations which recorded “..” and “no practice” were coded as missing observations. Upon retrieval, the 
dataset contained 1,850 country-year observations. The World Bank Enterprise Surveys Standardized Data 2006–2911 
was accessed on March 3, 2013 at the Full Survey data Portal of the Enterprise Survey website; the latest version of 
the Enterprise Surveys can be found here: http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/data/survey-datasets. Upon retrieval, the 
raw dataset contained 70,624 firm-country-year observations. The data series of GDP per capita, PPP at constant 2005 
international dollars was retrieved from the World Development Indicators database on April 26, 2013, at http://
databank.worldbank.org/data. For details, see online Appendix available with this paper at http://e-jep.org.
* Denotes 5% significance of the regression coefficient, robust standard errors.
Table 2—continued
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sample who more closely resemble the firms towards which the Doing Business are 
targeted by varying the sample by firm size, whether the firm is a limited liability 
businesses, and whether the firm is located in the capital city.
The picture shown in Table 2 is quite mixed; a number of the correlations go 
in the expected direction, but are frequently not significant. And some puzzles also 
emerge. For example, the number of procedures to start a business is positively 
correlated with firms saying that regulation is the biggest obstacle to doing business, 
whereas the time taken to start a business is mostly negatively correlated. In this 
issue, Hallward-Driemeier and Pritchett also find only weak correlations between 
changes over time found in the firm-level Enterprise Surveys and the Doing Busi-
ness indicators.
What to make of these patterns is largely a moot question. Enterprise-level 
surveys are a better way of exploring heterogeneity of the business climate within a 
country than the Doing Business Survey. However, data from the Enterprise Surveys 
do not necessarily give a better sense than the Doing Business project of country 
averages, given that firms will face different experiences with some dimensions 
of the regulatory and legal structures, which make the responses of professional 
lawyers in some ways more reliable. Moreover, firm-level data seek to be represen-
tative of the industrial structure as it stands, and cannot easily be used to explore 
how it would be different in the absence of barriers to formality or regulations. By 
definition, firms that do not exist because of adverse business conditions cannot be 
surveyed. Another potential explanation is that there is a distance between de jure 
and de facto regulatory processes. While it is impossible to say which of these factors 
could be at work, the poor correlation between Doing Business report indicators 
and firm-level surveys that ask similar questions is less surprising than it might seem 
at first blush.
Lawyers who are immersed in the complexities of law have been known to criti-
cize the Doing Business indicators as a crude measurement that may fail to capture 
relevant complexities. This critique has some literal truth in it. By design, the Doing 
Business data is incapable of capturing the complexities of the legal system. As 
mentioned earlier, the answers to the Doing Business survey questions are in some 
cases a mixture of de jure legal requirements and what happens de facto to busi-
nesses. Moreover, there is some in-house World Bank processing of the received 
data, in a way that is not especially transparent. That said, the lawyers’ criticism also 
reflects a culture clash between economists and lawyers. Economists can sometimes 
rightly be accused of being too willing to accept stylized and simplified characteriza-
tions of reality for the purposes of analysis. But the need for economic variables that 
can be expressed in a compact manner means that some short-cuts are inevitable.
The names of indicators or their content may in some cases be misleading, which 
emphasizes the need to look carefully behind the labels at the content of the indica-
tors. For example, one of the indicators is Paying Taxes, which in the Doing Business 
data is proxied by the number of separate taxes to be paid, hours per year that the 
reference company would spend preparing tax returns, and the total tax payable 
by that reference firm as a share of gross profit. From the standpoint of the broad 
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questions in public finance—that is, how a tax system can be designed to raise reve-
nues and to ensure compliance while avoiding unnecessary burdens on a country’s 
citizens—the Doing Business measure is narrowly focused and not well-connected to 
the broader concerns. For example, two of the biggest challenges in public finance 
for many countries in recent years have been in rolling out a value-added tax and 
in having firms assist employees in their compliance with the personal income tax. 
The Doing Business ranking on paying taxes is actually on average higher (a “worse” 
performance) in countries which have introduced a value-added tax: for example, in 
the 2006 Doing Business data, the average rank of countries that had a value-added 
tax was 91 compared to an average rank of 68 among countries that did not have a 
value-added tax. While having a value-added tax may not cause this lower ranking, 
it emphasizes the point that there is more to having a good tax system than ease 
of compliance. The Doing Business indicators would measure the burdens imposed 
on firms, but from a social perspective, any gains in revenue-raising efficiency would 
need to be balanced against such costs. Of course, the shortcomings of this measure 
should be apparent to anyone who actually looks.
The Getting Credit indicator seems named in a potentially misleading way, too. 
The unwary consumer of this data might presume that it refers to actual measures 
of credit. Instead, it is based on a Legal Rights index based on collateral and bank-
ruptcy laws and a Credit Information index based on the degree of sharing of credit 
information. This indicator is correlated with a range of credit outcomes, but it is 
not a measure of the quantity of credit nor how credit is allocated—or particularly 
the extent to which credit flows to the highest-return activities. Moreover, many 
aspects of the environment in which credit is obtained are not included, like the 
competitiveness of the financial system or measures of financial regulation such as 
capital requirements.
 It is also important to realize that the Doing Business indicators do not capture 
anything close to a complete picture of the business environment. Indeed, they are 
not in any meaningful sense a “first best” set of indicators. The project is not based 
on a grand design that begins from the question: “What would it take to capture the 
complete business environment across countries and over time?” Instead, the project 
has tended to proceed as a bottom-up entrepreneurial exercise, taking opportuni-
ties to add indicators of particular interest, and using a lot of a priori judgment. As 
the Doing Business project matures (which will require that additional resources be 
found), it could develop a more comprehensive view of the business environment. 
At present, some notable gaps in looking at the bigger picture of the business envi-
ronment include a wider view of infrastructure, competition policy, trade policy, 
and many dimensions of regulation such as workplace health and safety.
None of these issues should trouble an educated user of the data, who would 
be aware of such issues and could use the data accordingly. But journalistic accounts 
of the Doing Business rankings and the indicators on which they are based typically 
paint these data as a complete and representative picture.
If the Doing Business rank were strongly correlated with broad contours of the 
business environment, these limitations might not matter so much. Indeed, one 
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would expect strong correlations across the indicators, reflecting an overall level 
of state competence. For some purposes, this level of generality suffices. The fact 
that Singapore is top in the ranking in the Doing Business 2015 report is essentially 
sending this message. That Singapore does a little better than Sweden is probably 
not telling us very much of quantitative interest—they both have effective states that 
have helped to foster prosperity in a wide variety of ways. Equally, the fact that Chad 
or Libya have incompetent states probably does not hinge very much on the mix of 
indicators that are chosen to establish this.
For the basic task of getting regulatory and/or legal reform on the public 
policy agenda, just knowing where an aggregate ranking for a country is can be a 
useful start. But when the debate turns to specific dimensions of policy reform, the 
details matter. It is important not to follow any specific indicators slavishly, because 
it is always an open question whether the specific policy priorities are well reflected 
in the disaggregated Doing Business rankings. It’s also important to remember that 
certain policy reforms are likely to have complementarities across several policy 
dimensions—economic and noneconomic—like steps to speed up court decisions 
and to train more competent lawyers.
The Validity of the Indicators
The Doing Business indicators have been a boon to research. Many economic 
studies (including some of my own) use the Doing Business indicators as either 
right- or left-hand-side variables in regressions. To give a flavor of the uses to which 
these data have been put, Table 3 lists some studies that use the Doing Business indi-
cators on either the left- or right-hand side of regressions. There is no scientific basis 
for this selection of studies except that all of the studies are well-cited, suggesting 
that subsequent work has paid attention to them, for better or worse. In each case, 
the authors report patterns that emerge in comparisons across countries. In most 
cases, the concern is with whether a particular indicator is correlated with aggregate 
or firm-level outcomes, or whether, if used as a left-hand side variable, the indicators 
are correlated with country characteristics, history, or institutions.
Each study tells a story that can be elaborated in detail. To give a flavor of 
this, consider the highly influential paper by Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) 
listed in Table 3. It examined correlations between the Getting Credit indicators 
and a variety of credit market outcomes. They find that formal creditor protec-
tion, along with the existence of institutions that share information, are associated 
in cross-country data with a higher ratio of private credit to GDP. These correla-
tions seem relatively more important in higher-income countries. They also find 
strong correlations between the legal origins of a country—in particular, whether 
it evolved as a common law country relying more on private contracting, or as a 
civil law country relying more on government regulation and ownership—and the 
Getting Credit indicators. This finding has fuelled debates about the importance of 
credit market reforms and their value. It has also raised the issue of whether some 
kinds of legal systems are more conducive to creditor protection. The findings are 
clearly intriguing. It would be naïve to think that strong policy conclusions can be 
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drawn from a single study of this kind. However, it may influence the climate of 
opinion around what matters in improving the legal framework for credit.
The fact that so much academic research has taken the Doing Business indi-
cators seriously could be thought of as a prima facie case for using them in policy 
discussions. In general, the absence of a robust correlation between an indicator 
used as a right-hand side variable and an outcome of interest is taken to cast suspi-
cion on whether policymakers should use the Doing Business indicators in policy 
dialogues. On the other side, finding a robust correlation is often taken to constitute 
a prima facie case for using a certain policy tool. Both claims should be treated with 
caution. All of the standard concerns and caveats of using regression methods to 
inform policy apply when using the Doing Business indicators. Is the measurement 
Table 3 
Selected Studies that Make Use of the Doing Business Indicators
Author/Year/Title Core finding(s)
Doing Business indicator 
as left- or right-hand side 
variable?
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de- 
 Silanes, Shleifer, 2002, “The  
 Regulation of Entry.”
More burdensome regulation is associated  
 with higher levels of corruption; greater  
 size of informal economy; lower executive  
 constraints; and less political rights
Right-hand side
Left-hand side
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez- 
 de-Silanes, Shleifer, 2008,  
 “The Law and Economics of  
 Self-Dealing.”
Index measure of legal protection of minority 
 shareholders against expropriation is  
 positively correlated with financial  
 development
Right-hand side
Left-hand side
Djankov, McLiesh, Shleifer,  
 2007, “Private Credit in 129  
 Countries.”
Common law is associated with higher  
 creditor rights, while French civil law is  
 associated with higher incidence of public  
 credit registries. Increase in creditor rights  
 and public registry incidence is associated  
 with a higher ratio of private credit to GDP
Right-hand side
Left-hand side
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez- 
 de-Silanes, Shleifer, 2003,  
 “Courts.” 
Procedural formalism, the extent to which  
 dispute resolution is regulated, is  
 associated with longer duration of dispute;  
 lower enforceability; and, higher corruption
Right-hand side
Left-hand side
Nunn, 2007, “Relationship- 
 Specificity, Incomplete  
 Contracts, and the Pattern  
 of Trade.”
Countries with better contract  
 enforcement and judicial systems are also  
 more specialized in production of goods for  
 which relationship-specific investments are  
 the most important
Right-hand side
Left-hand side
Klapper, Laeven, Rajan, 2006,  
 “Entry Regulation as a  
 Barrier to  
 Entrepreneurship.”
Rate of firm-incorporation in ‘naturally  
 high-entry’ industries is lower in countries  
 where regulatory costs are higher
Right-hand side
Left-hand side
Djankov, Hart, McLiesh,  
 Shleifer, 2008, “Debt  
 Enforcement around the  
 World.” 
Index measure of efficiency of debt  
 enforcement is correlated with per capita  
 income and legal origins
Right-hand side
Left-hand side
(Continued)
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precise enough? Are the independent variables exogenous? Correlations uncovered 
in this way are open to a number of common criticisms. For example, controlling 
for a range of omitted variables in cross-country regressions is always problematic. 
If government competence has benefits, then it could well be positively correlated 
with both the Doing Business indicators and the outcomes of interest.
In addition, given the frame of reference for the Doing Business project 
(a particular kind of firm in the largest business city), we would expect consider-
able measurement error to arise because this particular measure of the business 
climate may not apply to firms that do not fit the standardized profile. The usual 
assumption is that measurement error should tend to bias correlations—in this case 
between doing business indicators and measures of firm performance—towards 
Table 3 —continued
Author/Year/Title Core finding(s)
Doing Business indicator 
as left- or right-hand side 
variable?
Besley, Persson, 2009, “The  
 Origins of State Capacity:  
 Property Rights, Taxation  
 and Politics.”
Countries with greater historical incidence of  
 external conflict also have stronger creditor  
 rights and sharing of credit information, but 
 there is no significant association with  
 investor protection
Left-hand side
Lerner, Schoar, 2005, “Does  
 Legal Enforcement Affect  
 Financial Transactions?  
 The Contractual Channel in  
 Private Equity.”
Countries that take longer time in contract  
 disputes are less likely to rely on preferred  
 stock and more likely to use debt for  
 investment structure
Right-hand side
Cooley, Marimon,  
 Quadrini, 2004, “Aggregate  
 Consequences of Limited  
 Contract Enforceability.”
Cross-country lower contract enforceability  
 is associated with larger economic growth  
 volatility
Right-hand side
Bae, Goyal, 2009, “Creditor  
 Rights, Enforcement and  
 Bank Loans.”
Stronger legal rights of creditors against  
 defaulting debtors is associated with larger  
 loan size, longer loan maturity, and a  
 reduction in loan-spreads
Right-hand side
Berglof, Pajuste, 2005, “What  
 Do Firms Disclose and  
 Why? Enforcing Corporate  
 Governance and  
 Transparency in Central and  
 Eastern Europe.”
Voluntary public disclosure by firms of  
 financial accounts is more prevalent in  
 countries with better functioning legal  
 systems
Right-hand side
Ciccone, Papaioannou, 2007,  
 “Red Tape and Delayed  
 Entry.”
Countries with less burdensome regulation  
 are associated with more entry in industries  
 that benefited under expansionary global  
 demand and technology shifts
Right-hand side
Left-hand side
Freund, Bolaky, 2008, “Trade,  
 Regulations, and Income.”
The positive impact of openness on  
 per capita income is reduced when there is  
 more regulation
Right-hand side
Left-hand side
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zero. However, if the Doing Business indicators are related to the composition 
of business enterprises, perhaps because there are fewer formal firms due to the 
business climate being poor, then the measurement error is no longer randomly 
distributed and the direction of bias is not clear a priori. This insight may further 
explain the inconsistent correlations reported on in Table 2.
Well-identified causal effects are frequently regarded as the “gold-standard” 
for much policy evaluation. But even if problems of endogenity and omitted vari-
able bias could be overcome for the Doing Business project, well-identified causal 
effects are in many contexts of limited value for concrete policy advice. First, there 
is tendency to focus on the average effects whereas in practice there are impor-
tant sources of heterogeneity that affect the impact of a policy reform in a specific 
context. Second, a persuasively established causal connection between a given 
indicator and an outcome of interest need not imply that reform in this policy 
dimension should be the highest priority for that country when there is limited 
capacity for reform. Third, there is no guarantee that reforms will be implemented 
effectively if they were attempted.
Finally, one should remember that the Doing Business indicators measure only 
formal processes. Countries vary enormously in the institutional structures outside 
the formal legal system. In China, for example, formal structures are weak but other 
mechanisms are conducive to private investment. Regression-based evidence strug-
gles to capture this kind of contextual information. Moreover, the quality of formal 
legal institutions and informal responses may well be co-determined, making it hard 
to condition on such factors.
Taking stock of these concerns, it is tempting to conclude that using regression-
based evidence as a basis for validating the Doing Business indicators is of limited 
value. But that conclusion would follow only from a narrow perspective on how 
evidence is accumulated and used in shaping opinion. The regression evidence 
matters as part of a narrative which blends theory and data without necessarily 
appealing to rigorous arguments about causation. Even well-identified causal 
effects, where they exist, mostly offer a one-dimensional perspective on what matters 
in policy debates, with external validity requiring a host of strong and untested 
assumptions. Observed correlations and their interpretation are frequently impor-
tant in debates about public policy reform.
Deregulation Bias?
A frequently heard criticism is that the Doing Business indicators have a dereg-
ulation bias—that is, lower levels of regulation lead to better scores and rankings. 
In an ideal world, it should be possible to separate the measurement of regulations 
from their normative status; for example, the data could show whether hiring and 
firing is more difficult in one country or another, without necessarily implying a 
policy conclusion. However, if a measure is put into a ranking, then a line has to be 
taken on what constitutes a better performance.
The claim that there is a bias towards deregulation is difficult to assess. Some 
of the specific items in the Doing Business rankings are more about government 
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efficiency than about the merits of regulation. For example, it is difficult to argue 
that it is an important regulatory goal to impose especially long time delays or high 
costs for those who want to start a new firm, or register commercial property, or 
engage in international trade, or get a construction permit. In other cases, like 
measures of financial disclosure by firms, functional bankruptcy laws, and sharing 
credit information, the Doing Business indicators seem to have more to do with 
building useful institutions than with a bias toward deregulation.
However, the Doing Business project as a whole is clearly motivated by a belief 
that frictions due to poor regulation and an ineffective legal system inhibit the 
performance of firms and can therefore lower job creation and impede poverty 
reduction. This view does permeate the choice of indicators and the way that 
data are collected. But to argue that this creates a wholesale deregulation bias is 
an overstatement.
The greatest controversy over a potential deregulation bias arose regarding the 
Employing Workers measure, which looks at how easy it is to hire or fire workers, and 
the rigidity of working hours. These sorts of labor market rules are hotly contested 
political territory, enough so that the Employing Workers indicators were removed 
from the country ranking. (The International Labor Organization (2007) was 
among the voices arguing for this change.) However, even without taking a stand 
on the appropriate degree of labor market regulation, there is scope for nuanced 
work in this area. For example, labor regulation success could be judged on the 
basis of indicators that achieve more employment generation on one dimension, 
and more or less worker protection on a separate dimension, without trying to be 
specific about any tradeoffs between these two goals. Indeed, the World Development 
Report (World Bank 2012) took a rather broader approach to labor market issues to 
that implicit in the Doing Business indicators for employing workers.
The Political Economy of Data Collection
It is not difficult to understand why the Doing Business project has proven to 
be both influential and controversial. A range of academics have used the data, 
leading to publications in top journals. This gives the project academic credibility. 
Policymakers refer to the rankings and even target them as policy objectives. This 
gives the project salience. Concerned citizens and civil society organizations also 
use them. This puts the project at the center of global debates. Finally, the data deal 
with issues that go to the heart of debates about the role of the state in economic 
development. This makes the project politically charged.
The Doing Business report and the debates which it has provoked underline the 
important role that the collection and dissemination of data play in policymaking. 
It is easy to forget that national income accounts were created primarily as a tool 
for economic management. The collection of poverty statistics is intimately linked 
to the desire to assess social and economic progress as well as to monitor the success 
of policies. Doing Business follows in this tradition, purposefully collecting data as 
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the basis for scrutinizing policy and monitoring progress. That said, when the report 
is publishing rankings and distance to the frontier, it would be naive to believe that 
data collection and presentation is a purely technocratic process. The Doing Business 
indicators are part of the policy debate and hence have the potential to influence poli-
cymaking. They are used by governments who set their own goals and internally by the 
World Bank, as well as by other multilateral organizations and foreign aid agencies.
The interaction between data and politics can be tricky. One common concern 
when measures become salient is that policymakers may seek to “game” the indi-
cators, rather than facing up to some of the more important challenges. This 
phenomenon is well-understood in other contexts and travels under a variety of 
names. For example, Campbell’s (1976, p. 49) law states: “The more any quan-
titative social indicator (or even some qualitative indicator) is used for social 
decision-making, the more subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more 
apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social processes it is intended to monitor.” An 
alternative label is Goodhart’s (1981, p. 116) law: “Any observed statistical regularity 
will tend to collapse once pressure is placed upon it for control purposes.” This risk 
becomes particularly important when specific policy indicators can become politi-
cized and hence salient in the eyes of policymakers. It is then important that there 
is not too much reliance on any particular single indicator, such as a ranking.
In the case of the Doing Business indicators, the accusation is that policymakers 
who desire to improve their Doing Business ranking may make pro forma changes 
in laws which have limited substantive value. The case of Rwanda, with 2015 Doing 
Business ranking of 47 (better than Italy) despite having per capita national income 
under $1,000 and more than 40 percent of its population in poverty, surfaces regu-
larly in such discussions. For people to be taken in by gaming, it must be that the 
indicators are being used in a naive way, as ends in themselves, when the value 
of changes are being appraised. Any robust policy dialogue must rely on a much 
broader assessment of reform than on the Doing Business rankings. Those who 
have a strategic purpose will either play up or overlook data limitations, depending 
on their political goals. One role of professional economists is to help maintain 
standards of balanced analysis.
A more fundamental concern about the political economy is whether the 
World Bank has a legitimate role in collecting and publicizing this kind of data. As 
the Doing Business report has become influential, the question of accountability 
for the data and processes of internal scrutiny has become pressing. In the demo-
cratic world, at least, the datasets collected and their purposes come under the 
general aegis of democratic accountability, and derive their legitimacy in this way. 
Although statistical agencies in many countries enjoy a degree of independence, 
which enhances their effectiveness, they are ultimately accountable for the work 
that they do.
Accountability for data not collected by a democratic nation state is more open 
to question. For example, nongovernment organizations such as Transparency 
International, Freedom House, Amnesty International, and the Heritage Founda-
tion collect data with a purpose and seek to influence policy through their efforts. 
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In these cases, accountability for the methods used and the validity of the measure-
ment is frequently unclear. In addition, the fact that the data is being collected by 
an organization with a policy agenda may raise suspicions in the eyes of users about 
the independence of the data collection process.
Of course, the World Bank is not a free-standing organization, but instead 
is responsible to its member governments through its board. It is also monitored 
by and frequently criticized by civil society organizations. This reality may make it 
increasingly difficult to have a controversial exercise like the Doing Business project 
housed at the World Bank. Although providing capital for development projects 
remains a core part of the World Bank’s activities, it is not the institution’s exclu-
sive focus. It also plays an important role in the development of data and ideas, 
and the World Bank would be a much less relevant organization if it chose always 
to back away from controversy. The World Bank has sponsored a variety of data-
based initiatives: for example, since the 1980s, it has been involved in collecting the 
Living Standard Measurement Surveys, gathering rich data on households in coun-
tries around the world, and since the 1990s, it has been carrying out the Enterprise 
Surveys of firms.
The Doing Business project and the annual reports that it produces are a 
legitimate and useful part of the mission of the World Bank as a development 
organization. Moreover, there are sound reasons to collect data in a systematic way 
that allows comparisons across countries and over time. The exercise will never 
be free from controversy and the data must be used with appropriate caveats. It 
is also important to have independent oversight by those who are not viewed as 
having any particular policy agenda. The fact that data can be abused or that it 
may on occasion upset certain political interests would be poor excuses for not 
trying to collect it.
Data is an important compliment to democratic accountability in countries 
where democratic pressure can be applied. This insight also implies that the Doing 
Business report is destined to be most effective as a tool for inspiring debate over 
policy change in countries that already have an interest in making policy reforms. 
Indeed, the Doing Business rankings are likely to be much less influential in coun-
tries that already have the means of holding their governments to account and have 
evolved data relevant to doing this. Many developing countries around the world 
labor under repressive governments that limit freedom of debate, where the data 
cannot easily be incorporated into an accountability process. It is often in the weakly 
institutionalized parts of the world where governments are less attentive to their 
citizens’ wishes that the loudest objections to data collection and dissemination are 
heard. However, access to the Internet and social media has made it much harder 
for governments to restrict access to data where they exist and the debates that 
they provoke.
As with any kind of economic data, nobody should use the measures from 
the Doing Business project without first understanding the details of how they are 
collected and what they do and do not measure. But even with its inevitable imper-
fections and growing pains, the Doing Business project seeks to measure issues 
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where economists knew almost nothing before the project began. Controversies 
over what the data can and cannot show should not be viewed as a distraction. Nor 
do they invalidate the work itself. They should instead be viewed as a useful and vital 
part of the public policy discussion. Such controversies illustrate how the measure-
ment of key variables can fuel important policy debates and help to propel the 
impact of economic ideas.
■ The author was a member of the World Bank panel that assessed the Doing Business project 
in 2013. He received no remuneration from any party for his input into the panel’s work. 
He is a now a member of the Doing Business Advisory Panel for which he also receives no 
remuneration. The author is grateful for helpful input from the board of editors, Chang-Tai 
Hsieh, and Gillian Paull. Anders Jensen provided excellent research assistance.
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